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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v-
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE
DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL
WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT.
POINT TWO: HAVING FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DISPOSITION OF A
PART OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ANY DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT.
POINT THREE:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS GUARANTEED THE LEASES IN QUESTION.
POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ANY JUDGMENT
FOR RESIDUAL OR SALVAGE VALUE.
POINT FIVE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Uniform Commercial Code, §9-504(3). (Corresponds to: §70A-9-504(3),
U.C.A. 1953 and §34-21-963(c), Wyoming Statutes 1977.)

§78-25-17, U.C.A.

1953; §25-5-4(2) U.C.A. 1953. These sections are reproduced in the Addendum
attached hereto.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff sued defendants in the court below for a deficiency judgment
arising out of five personal property leases entered into between plaintiff, as
lessor, and Bonneville Development Corporation, as lessee.

Plaintiff joined

the individual defendants (appellants here) claiming that they had guaranteed
the leases.
The leases in question were entered into between March, 1981 and
September 1981 and concerned certain goods and equipment to be installed in
the Ramada Inn of Evanston, Wyoming, which was owned by Bonneville
Development Corporation.

At the time of trial the plaintiff admitted that

the lease agreements were in reality financing vehicles, and that they would
be subject to the provision of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") (See
Memorandum Decision R.207)*
reference

[Note: As used throughout this brief the

fT

R.ff refers to the number affixed by the clerk to the record on

appeal; the reference fTTr." refers to the number affixed by the court reporter
to the transcript of the testimony presented at the trial of this matter.]
The leases in question were written on identical forms, but each bore
a distinct identifying number. The guarantee documents were also printed on
forms prepared by plaintiff, and the only thing which identified a guarantee
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as applying to a specific lease was the identifying number of the lease which
was typed on the guarantee document.

The individual defendants testified

that they had not executed any guarantees in connection with the leases in
question (Tr. 120, 221-226, 247), but that they had executed certain guarantee
documents in blank, which were delivered to plaintiff with respect to other
proposed leases which plaintiff had subsequently declined to fund (Tr. 124-125,
230, 248). They further testified that these lease guarantee forms were never
returned to them after plaintiff declined to fund the proposed leases with
which they were submitted (Tr. 134, 230, 248). No evidence was introduced
to account for these forms.
The trial court found that at the time the guarantee documents were
executed they were undated and were not identified by any lease number
(Findings of Fact No. 6 — See Addendum). In spite of this finding, and the
lack of any evidence in the record as to how the identifying number got placed
upon the guarantee documents, the trial court also found that the guarantee
documents were executed by defendants in connection with the lease agreements
in issue.
In approximately May, 1982 Bonneville Development Corporation
defaulted in the payment of the installments due under the lease agreements.
At that time Mr. Joe Jimenez, who was then the Regional Collection Manager
for plaintiff, wrote various letters in which he threatened to repossess the
collateral (Tr. 194-197.

See also Exhibits 52-D through 57-D).

However,

plaintiff did not repossess the collateral.
Mr. Jimenez, who appeared as a witness, also testified that he searched
the files relating to the leases in question, and that there were no personal
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guarantees of the individual defendants in plaintiff's file (Tr. 200).

He then

discussed the absence of personal guarantees with various officials of the
plaintiff company, and told them that there were no personal guarantees
relating to these leases (Tr. 200-204).

He testified that he had written a

memorandum to the file relating to the lack of personal guarantees for these
leases (Tr. 203). His testimony was uncontroverted. However, the memorandum
was not produced in evidence nor was any evidence introduced by the plaintiff
to explain its absence.
Mr. Jimenez also testified that the normal operating procedure at the
plaintiff company at that time in cases where there were personal guarantees,
was to write a demand letter to the guarantors, and that would have been one
of the first things he would have done had there been personal guarantees,
but that due to the lack of personal guarantees relating to the leases in
question he did not write any such letters to the individual defendants (Tr.
205). No such letters were offered into evidence.
Mr. Jimenez further testified that in searching the files of plaintiff
he did find other files relating to "deals that had been turned down" in which
he found personal guarantees which had been executed by these defendants
(Tr. 201).

He testified that these guarantees had not been filled in with a

lease number and a date as of the time he saw them (Tr. 209).
On October 5, 1982, the Ramada Inn of Evanston, Wyoming was placed
in receivership (Tr. 46) by order of the district court in Wyoming at the request
of Commercial Security Bank (Tr. 97). The receiver took possession of the
lease collateral along with the motel facility (Tr. 98). At that time defendant
Hansen requested that plaintiff repossess the lease collateral (Tr. 155-157).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-4~ may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

The plaintiff sent a letter in which it threatened to repossess the collateral
if the lease payments were not brought current by November 15, 1982 (See
Exhibit 42-P). Although no payments were made (Tr. 66), plaintiff failed to
repossess the collateral (Tr. 95), but left it on the premises where it could
be used by the receiver during the time he was in possession (Tr. 98). As of
the time of the sale approximately two years later, part of the equipment
was missing and plaintiff had no knowledge as to where it was (Tr. 50).
On May 31, 1983 Bonneville Development Corporation filed a petition
in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (Tr. 46).
No evidence was presented which would indicate that plaintiff made
any effort to assert the priority of its security interest in the collateral as
against the receiver or to obtain a ratification or disclaimer of the leases
from the trustee in bankruptcy from October, 1982 until the property was
finally sold.
On September 28, 1984, plaintiff consummated a sale of part of the
lease collateral to Commercial Security Bank ("Commercial Security") and First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First Security") for the sum of $85,000.00 (Tr.
88-98).

The evidence showed that Commercial Security and First Security

were creditors of Bonneville Development Corporation holding mortgages on
the Ramada Inn of Evanston (Tr. 88). The negotiations for the sale of the
collateral took place at the office of Commercial Security in Salt Lake City
(Tr. 88), whereas the collateral was located at the Ramada Inn in Evanston,
Wyoming (Tr. 95).

The representatives of the banks had not inspected the

equipment to ascertain its condition or value (Tr. 91-92), and neither plaintiff
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nor the purchasers had prepared nor were the purchasers aware of any appraisal
of the property (Tr. 91-93).
From the testimony presented at the trial it would appear that the
negotiations for the sale did not relate to the then-current condition or value
of the collateral, but only to what percentage of "plaintiff's estimate of value"
the purchasers would pay.

The testimony showed that the agreed purchase

price of $85,000.00 was based upon 18 percent of such value (Tr. 94-95).
Evidence subsequently presented to the court would indicate that the term
"plaintiff's estimate of value" really referred to the original cost of the
equipment in the five leases as invoiced to plaintiff. (See Tr. 332, where the
original cost was identified as $476,113.11. The purchase price of $85,000.00
realized by plaintiff upon the sale of the collateral equates to 17.9 percent
of $476,113.11.)
Gerald
Commercial

M. Engstrom,

Security

testified

Vice-President
that

he

and

personally

General

Counsel of

participated

with

representatives of First Security and plaintiff in the negotiations in which the
banks agreed to purchase the collateral.

He could not specifically identify

the date that the purchase agreement was negotiated.

To the best of his

recollection it was in the fall of 1983, but it could have been in the winter
of 1983/1984, and it was at least six months before the purchase price was
paid (Tr. 90-91). According to plaintiff's records, the purchase price was paid
on September 28, 1984 (Tr. 49).
On March 30, 1984 (which was after the commencement of the present
action), counsel for plaintiff sent a notice to the individual defendants advising
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them: "IFG intends to sell the equipment on or after the tenth day of April,
1984, at public or private sale." (See Exhibit 43-P.)
The evidence presented did not disclose any other effort on the part
of plaintiff to sell the collateral. Specifically, the evidence did not show any
attempt on the part of plaintiff to contact other potential purchasers, to
dispose of the collateral through dealers in that type of equipment or to
advertise the collateral in trade journals or any other type of media.
The sale of the lease collateral to Commercial Security and First
Security did not include a wood carving which plaintiff appropriated to its own
use, allowing an offset therefor in the amount of $4,000.00 (Tr. 50).
The only evidence presented by plaintiff as to value of the collateral
was in the form of testimony by Susan Trunzo, who testified that she had
been employed in the auction business for 15 years; that she had "looked
through" the list of equipment attached to the bill of sale to Commercial
Security and First Security and compared it with some invoices supplied by
plaintiff (Tr. 165); that she had experience in selling restaurant equipment at
auction (Tr. 168); and that she had sold office furnishings based upon her
inspection and estimate of the value of the item (Tr. 169). However, she also
admitted that she had not seen the equipment listed on the bill of sale (Tr.
175, 179) and that she had no experience with respect to sales of heat
exchangers, boilers and other types of heating equipment on the list (Tr. 169).
Over objections raised by the defendants as to the foundation for her
testimony and her qualifications to testify as to the value of the items listed
on the bill of sale (particularly in view of her testimony that she had not seen
the equipment) she was permitted by the trial court to testify that "a fair
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market recovery for this equipment" would be "somewhere between 15 to 25
percent" (Tr. 176).
On cross examination she admitted that her estimate of percentage
recovery was based upon an average value based upon her experience, rather
than anything related to the specific value or condition of the items listed,
since she had not seen the items on the equipment list (Tr. 179.) She also
testified that in her experience the seller is always at a disadvantage and the
sales price of an item is decreased if the item being sold is not seen by the
buyer (Tr. 180); that in her experience no one would come to an auction sale
if the seller did not contact known potential buyers and that she also would
always advertise in newspapers, trade journals and by direct mail (Tr. 181182), and that "a commercial and reasonable auctioneer" would not attempt
"such an auction as this without advertising" (Tr. 183), stating:

"We would

always advertise something like this." (Tr. 184.)
In determining the purchase price of the collateral, Mr. Engstrom also
testified that the buyers gave no value to the heat pumps "because we said
they were permanently attached"

(Tr. 96).

However, another witness, Cal

Gordon, testified that there were approximately 60 heat pumps at the Ramada
Inn, of which about 50 were new and had never been installed or put into
service (Tr. 186-187).

In her testimony, Ms. Trunzo also testified that if

equipment were new, her experience was that she would expect to get 75 to
80 percent of their worth upon liquidation (Tr. 177).

The invoices which

plaintiff put into evidence showed that the original cost of the heat pumps
amounted to $67,222.12. (See Exhibits 6-P and 13-P.)
<
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After the trial the court held that the individual defendants had
guaranteed the leases in question, that the sale of the collateral at private
sale by plaintiff

was commercially reasonable and

conformed

to

the

requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code, except as to the wood carving
which was retained by plaintiff and not sold, which the court found to be not
commercially reasonable. After allowing an offset of $10,000.00 "for the price
of this carving" (Conclusion of Law No. 3. See Addendum), the trial court
awarded plaintiff judgment against the individual defendants for the sum of
$822,623.22, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $13,485.00 and costs in the
amount of $302.00. (See Judgment in Addendum.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendants respectfully contend that the trial court erred in finding
that the plaintiff's disposition of any part of the collateral was commercially
reasonable as required by the UCC. In support of this contention defendants
submit that the evidence shows the plaintiff neglected the collateral and the
interests of both plaintiff and defendants in the collateral:
a.

It clearly appeared that plaintiff failed to exercise any of its

rights in the collateral, which left the collateral to be used by others for a
period of approximately two and one-half years after default in the payment
of the lease rental installments, and for approximately two years after plaintiff
was requested by one of the alleged guarantors to repossess the equipment.
b.

In disposing of the equipment plaintiff made no attempt in good

faith to obtain the best price it could for the collateral, such as by advertising
or contacting dealers in this type of equipment or other potential purchasers.
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It merely contacted the entities who were in possession of the facility where
the equipment was situated and where it had been used without payment for
at least two years, and entered into negotiations with them which were not
directed at obtaining any price based upon the value of the collateral at that
time.
c.

The consequence of failing to dispose of the collateral for the

leases in a commercially reasonable manner is that plaintiff is not entitled to
any deficiency judgment.
In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff retained for its own use part
of the leased property, described as a piece of art. The trial court properly
found that the disposition of this part of the collateral was not commercially
reasonable. However, based upon such finding the trial court also should have
held that plaintiff had failed to dispose of the collateral as required by the
UCC and should have denied plaintiff any deficiency judgment.
It is further respectfully submitted that plaintiff failed to prove by
proper legal standards that these defendants had ever guaranteed the leases
in question.
A decision on this appeal favorable to the defendants on any of the
foregoing matters would require a reversal of the judgment entered below in
its entirety. If this appeal were not to result in such a decision, defendants
contend that this court should still enter an order reversing the judgment in
part based upon the final two arguments of defendants.
Defendants contend that the court erred in including in the judgment
any sum based upon the residual value of the collateral because under the
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terms of the lease there is no obligation upon the lessee to pay the lessor for
its residual value.
Defendants also contend that the court erred in awarding attorneys
fees to plaintiff in excess of $10,000.00, based upon the evidence presented
at the trial.

The inclusion of this argument is not intended to constitute an

admission by defendants that plaintiff is entitled to any sum as attorneys fee.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE
DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT.
The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision:
"The parties agree that although these are designated as
leases, they are in effect financing agreements, and that the
Uniform Commercial Code applies. Therefore, it was the
obligation of the plaintiff to preserve the assets, and to sell
them in a commercially reasonable manner." (R.207.)
UCC §9-504(3), enacted in Utah as §70A-9-504(3) (see copy in
Addendum), allows a secured party after default to dispose of collateral, but
it requires that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable."
The courts of a majority of the states which have enacted the UCC
(including both Utah and Wyoming) have taken the position that any failure
on the part of the security holder to dispose of the collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner will result in a denial of the right to obtain a judgment
for any deficiency between the contract balance due and the proceeds of the
sale of the collateral.
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The leading case in Utah on this point is FMA Financial Corp. v. ProPrinters, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), which holds that in an action for a deficiency
judgment the secured party has the burden of establishing that the disposition
of the collateral was done in a commercially reasonable manner. In that case
the creditor failed to conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner
and was barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment.
It is respectfully submitted that a comparison of the significant
elements in Pro-Printer, supra, with the facts concerning the disposition of
the collateral in the instant case will demonstrate that IFG Leasing Co. made
even less effort to conduct a commercially reasonable sale.
PRO-PRINTER CASE

THE INSTANT CASE

1. Defendant requested that
secured party repossess equipment.

1. Defendant requested that IFG
repossess equipment.

2. Secured party repossessed
equipment and stored it six months
before selling it.

2. IFG failed to repossess equipment
but left it to be used for two years
prior to selling it.

3. Creditor "contacted only three
dealers" in selling equipment.

3. IFG made no contact with dealers
or potential purchasers.

4. Creditor made no attempt to
advertise equipment in local journals
normally used for that purpose.

4. IFG made no attempt to advertise
equipment in any media.

5. Creditor sold equipment to
owner of place where equipment was
stored.

5. IFG sold equipment to banks in
possession of facility where equipment
was located and where it had been
used.

6. Creditor had appraised equipment a few months before sale.

6. IFG made no appraisal of equipment.

7. Sale price was less than half of
appraised value, and only 21% of the
original invoice cost.

7. Equipment sold for 18% of IFG?s
original invoice cost.
(
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Courts generally have recognized that the UCC was designed to provide
an economical, extra-judicial method for disposing of the collateral after
default.

Recognizing that the secured creditor is pretty much unsupervised

in selecting the method of disposition and in carrying it out, the courts have
tended to balance the flexibility given creditors by imposing upon them the
burden of proving that their disposition of the collateral was conducted in a
manner calculated to protect the debtor's interest as well as their own interest
in the resale of the collateral. The courts have noted that these requirements
serve the interests of creditors as well as debtors, because producing a greater
return upon sale of the collateral reduces the necessity of seeking a deficiency
from guarantors.

Therefore, if the secured creditor fails to show that it

disposed of the collateral having due regard for the interests of the debtor, it
is fair that the creditor should lose any right to recover a deficiency from
the debtor and the guarantors, if any.
While the requirement of a "commercially reasonable" manner cannot
be defined with precision, it clearly means that in disposing of the coUatereal
the secured party must make a good faith effort to obtain a fair price for
the collateral, rather than to neglect the collateral and focus its efforts upon
recovering a deficiency from guarantors.
In this case the record shows that plaintiff commenced this action to
recover the full balance claimed from the alleged guarantors prior to taking
any action with respect to the collateral.
In Chittenden Trust Co. v. Maryanski, 415 A.2d 206 (Vt. 1980), the
Supreme Court of Vermont explained the duty underlying the "commercially
reasonable" standard as follows:
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§9-504(3) places a positive duty on the secured party
to act, with respect to every aspect of disposition, in a
commercially reasonable manner . . . . Although the specifics
of this duty Tcannot be meaningfully described except in terms
of particular fact situations,1 . . . in general it means that
T
[t]he secured party is required to utilize his best efforts to
sell the collateral for the best price and to have a reasonable
regard for the debtorfs interests • • . • Of course, the fact
that a better price could have been obtained does not
necessarily mean that the sale was not commercially
reasonable, . . . but the secured party must make a good
faith effort to maximize the value of the collateral . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) (All authority cited has been omitted.)
In that case among the key considerations which led the court to hold
that the disposition of the collateral was not commercially reasonable was
evidence that the collateral (restaurant equipment) was sold to the owners of
the building in which the defendants restaurant had been located (with no
discussion of any efforts to find other potential purchasers) and that the
equipment, which was two years old and worth $63,000 when new, had been
sold for "only $12,000." (It is interesting to note that the sale price in that
case equalled 18.3% of its new value.)
The Supreme Court of Vermont concluded:
"Under any construction of [the] evidence, findings
sufficient to support a conclusion that plaintiff carried its
burden of showing a commercially reasonable disposition of
collateral would be clearly erroneous. The evidence simply
does not support the result reached, . . . and therefore the
result cannot stand." (Id., 415 A.2d at 209-210.)
In the instant case the record does not show that plaintiff made any
good faith effort to maximize the value of the collateral, or that it used its
best efforts to sell the collateral for the best price it could obtain or that it
had any regard for the interests of the defendants in the collateral.
The disposition of the collateral by plaintiff occurred almost as an
afterthought, and was clearly done without any attempt to obtain any substantial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated -OCR,
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return.

Plaintiffs

actions in regard

to the collateral

demonstrate

an

indifference which falls far short of the judicial requirements of a commercially
reasonable disposition.
In In re Hamby, 19 BR 776, 33 UCCRS 1811 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.,
ND Ala. 1982) the court stated:
"Commercial transactions must have as their purpose the
obtaining of a profit as opposed to the incurring of a loss,
if they are to be deemed reasonable. A method of sale
which produces only one bid and a sale at 15% below wholesale
value is calculated to produce a commercial loss and if such
a method is consistent and is persisted in, a commercial or
business failure will result. It is not a reasonable method
in the commercial setting. If the method of sale employed
by the claimant was not of this character, appropriate
distinctions should have been shown by the secured party."
In the case of Peoples Acceptance Corp. v. Van Epps, 60 Ohio App.2d
100, 395 N.E.2d 912 (1978) the court stated:
"The standards which should be used to determine a
commercially reasonable sale are matters of fairness and
business practice. The secured party should always attempt
to sell the repossessed collateral for the best price possible,
and where there is a gross discrepancy between the disposal
and the original sale price of the repossesed collateral, there
must be some affirmative showing on the part of the secured
party that the terms of the repossession sale were
commercially reasonable."
That case involved a situation where the secured party brought suit
against a debtor for a deficiency after repossessing and selling a motor vehicle.
The purchaser had agreed to pay $1,989.00 for the car which was sold following
repossession nine months later for $200.00.

The court held that "the price

for which a vehicle is sold after repossession is one of the Ttermsf which must
be considered in determining whether or not a sale is commercially reasonable
as required by the Uniform Commercial Code." (Id., 395 N.E.2d at 916.) The
court

noted in its decision that the record was devoid of any testimony
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regarding the condition of the car or its fair market value at the time of the
repossession sale, that the sale of the car was not advertised, that the car
was sold at private sale for little more than one-tenth of its original purchase
price, and concluded that the sale was not commercially reasonable.
In the case at bar, the record also discloses (in addition to the other
factors mentioned above) that the deficiency claimed by plaintiff and awarded
by the trial court against defendants was approximately ten times the amount
realized by plaintiff from its disposition of the collateral.
In Mercantile Financial Corp. v. Miller, 292 F.Supp. 797 (1968), the
court stated:
"The evidence also indicated that Mercantile [the secured
party] neither sold these assets Tin the usual manner in any
recognized market thereforeT nor that it Tsold in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
type of property sold * * * T, §9-507(2). It conducted this
auction with only a minimal amount of publicity,
. . . .
Mercantilefs failure to locate likely purchasers of these assets
and its eagerness to conduct a sale at which it knew only
one bid would be made, and that by a bidder . . . who had
no knowledge of the local market for these assets, strongly
supports Miller?s contention that this sale was not in
conformity with §9-504. The conduct of this auction differed
markedly from the conduct of a general auction of such
materials described as Commercially reasonable' by the
defendants expert witness." (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the similarity of the underlined portion of material
quoted above to the facts of this case, at the trial of this matter the plaintiff
produced as a witness an auctioneer, who testified on cross-examination that
from her experience the sales price would be decreased if the items being
sold were not exhibited at the sale; that in making sales she would always
advertise the sale in newspapers, trade journals and by direct mail; that she
would also make an effort to contact potential buyers; and that an auctioneer
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would not be commercially reasonable to attempt to make a sale without
advertising (Tr. 179-184). The record discloses no effort by plaintiff to observe
even these minimal precautions in disposing of the collateral for the leases in
issue.
In In re: Thomas, 12 UCCRS 578 (1973) the court pointed out that
UCC §9-504(3) provides that collateral may be liquidated at either public or
private sale. A public sale was stated to be one in which due advertisement
of the sale is made to the public to attend and bid. The court then stated:
"On the other hand, disposition by private sale
contemplates that the creditor has used some diligence to
obtain buyers who will submit private bids for the property.
It is not sufficient, nor can it be said to be a commercially
reasonable disposition, to park a vehicle in some obscure lot
surrounded by a fence and make such display the only means
whereby a private bid might be lodged with the creditor by
a prospective buyer. Here there is no evidence that any
designated party viewed the vehicle or submitted a bid or
declined to do so. No specific party was pointed out in the
evidence except the purchaser . . . ."
In the instant case the collateral was not parked on some obscure lot
and surrounded by a fence. However, the circumstances were not significantly
different than had it been so placed. The collateral was situated in Evanston,
Wyoming, while the sale was negotiated in Salt Lake City; the extent, condition
and value of the collateral was not demonstrated to the purchaser by the
secured party; and, the only subject of the negotiation between the parties
related to the percentage of the original invoice price that would be paid by
the purchaser. Furthermore, although more than six months elapsed between
the date the sale was negotiated and the date it was consummated, the record
is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff made any effort whatever during
this interim to obtain a better price for the collateral.
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On the contrary, there is a clear inference in the testimony that
plaintiff did not make any such effort. At the trial Mr. Bruce Reading, counsel
for plaintiff, took the stand and among other things, testified:

". . . at the

time that letter went out I knew we were in the final preparations of selling
the equipment to the bank and I also knew that, in all likelihood, the sale
would take place with the bank."

(Tr. 256-257.)

The letter he referred to

was dated March 30, 1984 (see Exhibit 43-P). The sale was consummated on
September 28, 1984 (Tr. 49).
There is no evidence in the record which even suggests that plaintiff
took any steps to assert its security interest in the collateral against the
receiver or the trustee in bankruptcy, by reason of which the collateral was
used without any payment being made on the leases for more than two years.
In Wayne Bank v. Pore, 119 Mich.App. 634, 326 N.W.2d 588 (1982)
the plaintiff had a security interest in the inventory of a debtor corporation,
which the Internal Revenue Service had confiscated pursuant to a tax lien.
Even though its security interest in the inventory was superior to the interest
of the Internal Revenue Service, plaintiff did not contact the Internal Revenue
Service in any manner to assert its prior lien on the collateral. Rather, eight
weeks later plaintiff notified the defendant, seeking to enforce defendant's
obligation under a guaranty.
The trial court held that plaintiff had acted in a commercially
unreasonable manner by failing to notify the Internal Revenue Service of its
prior interest in the inventory. The Court of Appeals of Michigan noted that
UCC §1-102(3) requires that a secured party exercise good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care. The court held that the failure of the secured party
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to notify the Internal Revenue Service and defendant constituted an unjustifiable
failure to meet the standards set forth in §1-102(3). Since this formed the
basis of the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff had acted in a
commercially unreasonable manner, the judgment of the trial court was
affirmed.
It is respectfully submitted that the acts of plaintiff in the disposition
of the collateral must be viewed in their totality, and that the failure of
plaintiff to assert its security interest in the collateral against the receiver
and the trustee in bankruptcy further indicates that the plaintiff did not dispose
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt
Company, Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1971) the court stated:
"The burden on the secured creditor is by no means
onerous. If he wishes a deficiency judgment he must obey
the law, the relevant provisions of which are now simpler
and more flexible than before. If he does not obey the law
he may not secure a deficiency judgment."
It should also be noted here that the lease guarantee forms which
the plaintiff relied upon in bringing suit against appellants provided that in
the event any controversy or claim arose out of the guaranty, any questions
of law should be decided in accordance with the laws of Wyoming.

(See

Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P.)
The State of Wyoming has enacted the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Wyoming equivalent of UCC §9-504(3) is found substantially unchanged as
§34-21-963(c) Wyoming Statutes, 1977. (See Addendum.)
The decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court are consistent with the
decisions cited above, and among other things clearly hold that the secured
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party has the burden of pleading and proving that its disposition of the collateral
was in strict compliance with the requirements of §9-504(3),

Failure to do

so will prevent the creditor from obtaining a judgment for any deficiency
between the unpaid balance and the sale price of the collateral. See, Aimonetto
v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972).
In Eggeman v. Western National Bank, 596 P.2d 318 (Wyo. 1979), the
Wyoming Supreme Court further stated:
Tt

A judicial sale cannot be held in a Tgrab bagf fashion.
Such a sale would not be commercially reasonable. All parties
to the sale must have an opportunity to see and evaluate
the goods being sold."
Evidence presented at trial clearly shows that plaintiff failed to meet
the standards of a commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral sold
to Commercial Security and First Security, and therefore, that the judgment
of the trial court should be reversed.

POINT TWO: HAVING FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DISPOSITION
OF A PART OF THE COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF
ANY DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT.
The trial court held that the retention by plaintiff of the wood carving
was not a commercially reasonable disposition. However, the trial court also
held that the plaintiff's disposition of the remaining collateral was commercially
reasonable.

(Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3. See Addendum.)

it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in so holding,
inasmuch as the requirement of the UCC is that

T

\ . . every aspect of the

disposition . . . must be commercially reasonable." The UCC does not say that
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to the extent that the disposition is found to be commercially reasonable the
creditor may obtain a deficiency judgment.
The case of DeLay First National Bank and Trust Company v. Jacobson
Appliance Co., 196 Neb, 398, 243 N.W2d 745 (1976) involved a situation where
a secured creditor disposed of the collateral in several transactions. As stated
by the Supreme Court of Nebraska:
"The problem herein is that there was more than one
sale, some of which can be upheld. We believe the intent
of the Uniform Commercial Code would appear to mandate
that the entire disposition of collateral by the secured party
be viewed as one transaction, and that every aspect of that
transaction be in accord with the requirements of the Uniform
Commercial Code. To adopt any other rule would place upon
the court the sometimes impossible and time-consuming task
of attempting to determine the amount of recoverable
deficiency as well as the amount of unrecoverable deficiency.
What we said in Bank of Gering v. Glover, [192 Neb.
575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974)], is pertinent herein: !The creditor
is given several options in disposing of collateral and very
minimal formal requirements. The burden on the secured
creditor is to comply with the law. The act is framed in
his interest. It is not onerous to require him to give notice
of the time and place of sale. In some instances it will be
to the creditors advantage to do so. On the other hand, to
permit him to proceed otherwise does place an onerous burden
on the debtor/
"We adhere to the position we adopted in Bank of Gering
v. Glover, supra. The right to a deficiency judgment depends
on compliance with the statutory requirements. We now hold
that if a creditor wishes a deficiency judgment he must
comply with the law in each transaction. While this rule
may seem harsh, we are persuaded by the fact that the
burden is on the secured creditor to comply with the law.
The act is framed in his interest. It is not onerous to require
him to observe the provision of the law." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978),
the Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled to the same effect.

In that case the

plaintiff had repossessed the assets (consisting of parts, inventory, used vehicles,
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tools, equipment, furniture and fixtures) of an automobile dealer.

The bank

"sold" the collateral to itself by entering a credit upon certain promissory
notes after giving notice to the debtors (including the defendant Beck, who was
a guarantor) that after a specified date all collateral would be sold at private
sale pursuant to the UCC.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming noted that §9-504(3) contains the
following provision:
"The secured party may buy at any public sale and if
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized
market or is of a type which is the subject of widely
distributed standard price quotations he may buy at a private
sale."
The opinion of the court indicated that the collateral was not of the
type indicated in that provision. Therefore, the court rejected the argument
of the creditor that even though it had violated the commercial code, the
trial court was in error in finding that the bank operated in a commercially
unreasonable fashion.
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the violation of a specific
statute is commercially unreasonable as a matter of law. However, the court
also recognized that the courts are not in agreement as to the penalty to be
imposed upon the creditor in such situations. After analyzing the holding of
various states on the subject, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the
law in Wyoming had been settled in the case of Aimonetto v. Keepes, supra.
where the court stated:
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rt* « * [w] e are persuaded that one general principle
upon which plaintiffs rely is applicable here, . that is,
compliance with §34-9-504(3) is a condition precedent to
recovery of any deficiency between sale price of collateral
and the amount of the unpaid balance." (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, the court sustained the trial court and denied the secured
party any deficiency judgment.
The evidence in this case showed that a wood carving (described in
the testimony by plaintiff's witness as "a piece of art" — Tr. 50.) formed part
of the collateral for the leases in question, and that it was retained by plaintiff
rather than sold with the other collateral.
Plaintiff's witness testified that plaintiff "as the current owner of
that art piece" had assigned it a value of $4,000.00, although it was originally
invoiced to plaintiff for $2,000.00 (Tr. 50).
Defendant Hansen, however, testified that the invoiced price to
plaintiff was only a part of the total price Bonneville Development Corporation
had paid for the carving; that $4,000.00 was not a fair price for it because, "It
is one of a kind. It was featured in a number of articles. It is a great piece
of work."

(Tr. 159.)

Although he was an officer of the corporation which

had owned the art work, Mr. Hansen was not permitted by the trial court to
give his opinion of the value of the work, but he was permitted to testify that
he felt that the total purchase price paid for it by the corporation was
$10,000.00. (Tr. 160.)
The trial court held that the "sale" of the wood carving was not
commercially reasonable and allowed an offset therefor in the amount of
$10,000.00. (Conclusion of Law No. 3.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

It is respectfully submitted in view of the authority cited above that
the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff had not disposed of the
art piece in a commercially reasonable manner, but that the trial court should
have ruled also that plaintiff's failure to comply with §9-504(3) in its disposition
of all of the collateral barred the recovery of any deficiency judgment.

POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS GUARANTEED THE LEASES IN QUESTION.
Evidence

was presented

at

the trial

with regard

to

guarantee

agreements executed by defendants which plaintiff asserted showed that the
defendants had guaranteed the leases in question.
The alleged guarantees were marked as Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P
and 30-P.

All of these documents bore dates prior to December 31, 1981.

The witness who introduced these exhibits, Ms. B. J. Rakes, testified that she
was not employed by plaintiff until January 4, 1984, and that she first received
the records concerning this case at the end of July, 1984 (Tr. 13).
The testimony of Ms. Rakes which served as the foundation for the
introduction into evidence of Exhibit 2-P is as follows:
"Q (By Mr. Reading) B. J., you said those are guarantee
documents; is that correct?
"A

That's correct.

?T

Q How do you know that they apply to this particular
lease file?
Tt

A They indicate that it is the Bonneville Development
Corporation d.b.a. Ramada Inn, Evanstion, Wyoming with lease
no. 56809.
TT

Q
And that is the same lease number that is on
Exhibit 1; is that correct?
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"A

That's correct.

"Q Can you read the signature on the bottom of those
documents?
He He *

$

$

"A (By the witness) Someone has signed the signature
above Jim P. Hansen where it has been typed in as Jim P.
Hansen.
"Q (By Mr. Reading) What is the typed names on that
document on the left of the guarantors?
"A
One is typed Rodney S. Gordon and one is typed
Frank A. Nelson." (Tr. 14-17.)
Subsequently, when Exhibit 2-P was offered into evidence, upon voir
dire examination Ms. Rakes testified that she did not know when the identifying
number in the box in the upper right-hand corner of the document was put on
the document or who put it there. She also testified that she did not know
when the document was dated, or by whom. (Tr. 26-27.)
Thereafter the court inquired of counsel:
"Do you have an objection to the receipt of the document
[Exhibit 2-P] as a business record?
"Mr. Marshall: Of course I do have an objection to the
receipt of the document as to what the document purports
to be, Your Honor, for any purpose. Now, she can say she
found it in the company files, [which the witness had not
stated in her testimony at that point] but beyond that I donTt
think this witness is qualified to testify to this by her own
testimony here, Your Honor. On that basis I would object
to the admission of that document.

"Judge Billings: Well, the objection as to the receipt of
Exhibit 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 as to them being received as
business records will be overruled but counsel may have—
"(Whereupon, plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 6 were
offered and received into evidence at this time.)" (Tr. 28-29.)
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Subsequently, similar objections were preserved as to the other
documents claimed as guarantees (Exhibits 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P) which
were also admitted into evidence upon the basis that they were business records
of the plaintiff.

(Tr. 35.)

It is respectfully submitted that no proper foundation was laid for
introducing these exhibits into evidence even upon the basis that they were
business records, since no one had presented any evidence up to that point as
to where the documents came from.
Subsequently, the defendants testified that they had executed certain
guarantee agreements upon forms presented bv plaintiff, but that those forms
were submitted to plaintiff in connection with other lease proposals which the
plaintiff later declined to fund, and that those forms were executed in blank,
in the sense that neither the date nor the identifying number were filled in at
the time they were executed and delivered to plaintiff.
This testimony of the defendants was uncontroverted, and was
supported by evidence presented by the plaintiff to the effect that the
procedures of the plaintiff required that all lease documentation had to be
executed by the lessee and returned to plaintiff for acceptance, and that
plaintiff did not assign a number to a lease until it had the documentation
completed, and had accepted the lease. (Tr. 55.)
The trial court found that at the time the guarantee agreements were
presented they were not dated and were not identified by lease number.
(Finding of Fact No. 6 — copy in Addendum.)
It is important to note that the identifying number is the only thing
on the document which ties the guarantee to any specific lease.
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However,

no evidence was presented at any time to indicate the identity of the person
who put these numbers on the guarantee agreements or the circumstances
under which they were put on those documents.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in admitting
Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P into evidence for any purpose.
§78-25-17, U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows:
"The party producing as genuine a writing which has been
altered, or appears to have been altered after its execution
in a part material to the question in dispute must account
for the appearance of alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another without his concurrence, or
was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or
otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration
does not change the meaning or language of the instrument.
If he does this, he may give the writing in evidence, but not
otherwise?' (Emphasis added. See copy in Addendum.)
It should be noted here that filling in blanks is considered as an
alteration of the document. See, First National Bank in Dallas v. Walker, 544
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1976); Farmers State Bank of Yuma v. Klein, 410 P.2d 632
(Colo. 1966.).
Since there was no evidence presented to the trial court showing the
identity of the person(s) who put the identifying numbers on the exhibits in
question or the circumstances under which they were put there, the court
erred in admitting them into evidence. Without those documents in evidence
the finding of the trial court that defendants guaranteed the leases in issue
would be unsupported in the evidence, and contrary to the Utah Statute of
Frauds, §25-5-4(2) U.C.A., 1953. (See copy in Addendum.)
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POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ANY
JUDGMENT FOR RESIDUAL OR SALVAGE VALUE.
During the course of the trial proceedings the parties stipulated that
the equipment which was the subject of the lease agreements had a residual
value of five percent (Tr. 85.) No other evidence was presented to the trial
court with reference to this residual value.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial court
concluded that plaintiff "should be awarded the residual value of the equipment,"
in the amount of $23,805.65 (Conclusions of Law No. 5(b) — See Addendum).
According to the discussion of this court in Pro-Printers, supra, the
residual value normally refers to the amount for which the equipment could
be purchased at the conclusion of the lease and therefore, the stipulation that
the equipment had a residual value of five percent was material to the
determination that the leases were in reality financing agreements.
However, no evidence was presented to the court in this case that
the lessee had ever agreed to pay plaintiff the residual value of the equipment.
The leases do not impose any such obligation on the lessee. Furthermore, the
leases do contain an integration clause which states:

"This instrument

constitutes the entire agreement between lessor and lessee. . • ." (See paragraph
26 of Exhibits 1-P, 8-P, 15-P, 22-P and 29-P. Emphasis added.)
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the court erred in including
an award for residual value in any amount in the judgment.
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POINT FIVE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF.
During the course of the trial Mr. Bruce Reading, counsel for plaintiff,
desired to present his own testimony as to the amount of attorney's fees which
he claimed should be awarded.

Counsel for defendants stated that they would

accept a proffer.

Thereupon, according to the transcript, the

(Tr. 99.)

following occurred:
"Mr. Reading: Your Honor, I would proffer that ITm an
attorney of the Utah State Bar and that our office has an
across-the-board billing rate of $75.00 per hour whether it is
a senior attorney or first associate out of school, that we
have spent significant time not only in preparation for this
trial but also in the various motions that were heard before
on the default judgment and memorandum that we've
submitted in regards to that. We feel a reasonable attorney's
fee in the prosecution of this case is $10,000.00.
"Judge Billings: Just for the benefit of counsel, this
court, if, in fact, it ends up awarding a judgment for
attorneys fee, feels that pursuant to our local rules that
that would not be sufficient and will ask, if you could, get
accounting sheets and simply attach it to an affidavit. But
thereTs no reason for you to testify in court as to that if
itTs acceptable to counsel.
"Mr. Marshall:

That's acceptable.

"Mr. Barber: That f s fine." (Tr. 99-100. Emphasis added.)
Thereafter, on March 11, 1985, two weeks after the trial concluded,
Mr. Reading filed with the court an affidavit, to which he attached copies of
his billings to plaintiff.

In the affidavit, Mr. Reading stated:
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tT

3. That the actual time expended and billed in the
above matter is Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Five
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($13,485.50).
^F

^F

*r

^F

^F

"5. Based upon the amount in controversy and the
defenses raised, a reasonable attorney's fee in this action
should be Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00)." (R. 223224. Emphasis added.)
On March 15, 1985, counsel for defendants filed with the court
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
in which among other things they objected to an award of attorney's fees as
set forth in the proposed judgment ($17,000.00), upon the basis that counsel
for plaintiff had testified that the amount of attorney's fee which he sought
was $10,000.00. (R. 213.)
The trial court awarded attorney's fees in the sum of $13,485.00.
(See Judgment in Addendum.)
It is respectfully submitted that the court's invitation to which counsel
for defendants agreed was for counsel for plaintiff to justify by affidavit his
testimony that a reasonable attorney's fee was in the amount of $10,000.00.
It was not an open-ended invitation or consent that a different amount could
be submitted to or awarded by the court.
Consequently, it is submitted that in the event this court finds that
any amount of attorney's fee should be awarded, which defendants do not
admit, plaintiff should be limited to the sum of $10,000.00.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully submit, in the alternative:
1.

That the judgment of the lower court should be reversed because

the evidence presented at trial did not show that plaintiff disposed of any part
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
2.

That the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because

the trial court correctly concluded that the retention of the art piece by
plaintiff was not a commercially reasonable disposition, which should preclude
plaintiff from obtaining any deficiency judgment.
3.

That the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because

the finding of the court that defendants had guaranteed the leases in question
was based upon evidence which was improperly admitted into evidence.
4.

That the judgment of the trial court should be reduced by the

sum of $23,805.65 (plus interest calculated thereon) because the plaintiff is
not entitled to any award based on the residual value of the equipment.
5.

That the judgment of the trial court for attorneys fees should

be reduced to an amount not in exess of $10,000.00.

Respectfully submitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

n -

,

I hereby certify that I served four copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon the plaintiff, by maiHtig the same to Plaintiff's
Attorney, J. Bruce Reading, 261 East 300 South, Second Floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on this y&™( day of August, 1985.

X^juoJ2r>

V^OJ^UJM.
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ADDENDUM

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
JUDGMENT
SECTION 70A-9-504(3), U.C.A. 1953
SECTION 34-21-963(c), WYOMING STATUTES, 1977
SECTION 25-5-4, U.C.A. 1953
SECTION 78-25-17, U.C.A. 1953
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Judge Judith M. Billings

,

H 5 W 13

25 S I

The

above-entitled

matter

came

on

for

trial

before

CM H

5

15

the

Honorable

16

Court, during the time period of February 21, 1985 through February

17

25,

18

Reading, attorney at law, the defendants Hansen and Gordon being

19

represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and defendant

20

Nelson being represented by Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law,

21

and the Court having heard evidence and accepted exhibits and hav-

1985,

Judith

with

the

M.

Billings, Judge of the

plaintiff

being

represented

above-entitled

by

Mr. Bruce

22 ing reviewed both testimony and documents after taking the matter
23

under advisement now enters the following:

24

FINDINGS OF FACT

25
26

1.

That

the

defendants

are

County, and the Court has jurisdiction

residents
of both
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of

Salt

Lake

the individual

defendants and the subject matter of this litigation.
2.
n/k/a

That

Irving

Corporation

corporate

Financial
are

County,

State

of

United

the

the

Utah

of

defendants

Corporation

and

corporations

States

Bankruptcy

Bonneville

doing

Utah, and presently,

Ecotek

business

are under

Court

having

National

Development

in

Salt

the

filed

Lake

protection
Chapter

11

proceedings.
3.
September
the

That during the time period of October 1980 through

1981,

control

each

and

serving

corporation,

on
and

the

individual

operation

of

the board
holding

defendants

Bonneville

of

directors

existing

were

principals

Development
and

Corporation,

as officers

shareholder

in

interests

of

the

or

the

right to acquire that position.
4.
tion
to

d/b/a

the

That

the

Ramada

defendant

Bonneville

Inn, Evanston, Wyoming

plaintiff

the

following

leases

Development

executed
on

or

and

about

Corporadelivered
the

dates

indicated:

5.
each

of

the

a.

On or about March 6, 1983, lease no. 56809;

b.

On or about May 14, 1981, lease no. 56810;

c.

On or about June 20, 1981, lease no. 56811;

d.

On or about July 29, 1981, lease no. 56812; and

e.

On or about September 3, 1981, lease no. 57938.

That
five

on

or

about

leases,

the

each

of

dates
the

of

the

execution

individual

of

defendants,

Hansen, Gordon, and Nelson, executed a continuing and unconditional
guaranty

agreement

whereby

they

agreed

to

perform,
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9

pay,

and

__ _ _

discharge all of the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation's
obligations under the respective lease agreements.
3

6.

4 with

each

At the time when guaranty agreements were presented
of

the

above

five

leases,

the

guaranty

agreements

5 were not dated and were not identified by lease number.
7.
plaintiff,
8

That

and

each

the

of

the

defendant

five

leases

Bonneville

were

funded

Development

by

the

Corporation

received the use of personal property pursuant to those leases.
8.

That the

last payment made by the defendants under

10 any of the lease contracts was on May 13, 1982.
T5

n

H •
3 I O

«) H a> 1 2
o => •:

9.

attempted

to

force

payments

during

the

summer of 1982, but did not repossess the collateral.

0 c -

10.

HD » 13
4

Plaintiff

The

defendant

Bonneville

Development

Corporation

UJ

d/b/a

S S2

Ramada

Inn,

Evanston,

Wyoming

was

placed

in

receivership

N I-

5

15 on the 5th day of October, 1982.
11.

16
17 filed

for

That the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation

protection

in the United

States

Bankruptcy

Court

for

18 the District of Utah on May 31, 1983.
19

12.

20 sent

to

21 them

of

22 the

the
the

subject

That

on

or

defendants
date

after

matter

of

about

March

Gordon,
which

the

30,

Hansen,

1984,

and

the personal

letters

Nelson

were

informing

property, which

leases, would be

sold

at private

was
or

23 public sale.
24

13. The personal property was sold to Commercial Security

25 Bank

and

26 1984

at

First
private

Security
sale

for

Bank

during

the

month

the

amount

of

Eighty

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dollars ($85,000.00).

of

September,

Five

Thousand

14.

Expert

witness

testimony

placed

the

value

of

the

personal property at fifteen to twenty-five percent of the original
3

purchase

4

eighteen percent (18%) of its original value.
15.

5

The

actual

amount

received

was

approximately

No written notification of acceleration of payments

6

pursuant

7

plaintiff to the defendants.

8

filing of the complaint in this matter on or about 12th day of

9

December, 1983.

10

t5

value.

n

to

paragraph

19(b) of the leases was ever sent by the
Such notification was only given by

As a part of plaintifffs bargain, it had established

16.

residual or salvage value in the equipment of Twenty-Three Thousand

Z oo

3*o
2<E 10
a h

<D

Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.63).

1^

17.

?P 13
<

U

w1 *
0
h
J

o

a wood

2

sS* 14
15
U)

At

carving

the
was

time

of

retained

the
by

sale of

the personal property,

the plaintiff

and not sold with

the other personal property.

16

18.

17

($6,000.00) paid by

18

property under the leases was never cashed.

19

A

19.

check

in

the

amount

the plaintiff

of

Six

Thousand

for certain items of personal

Attached hereto, as appendix

"A" to these findings,

20

is the recap

21

under each of the leases for the sale of equipment.

22

20.

of

The

23

agreed, pursuant

24

attorney fees.

25
26

21.
in

support

all

amounts

defendant
to the

Plaintiff's
of

attorney's

Dollars

due and owing and amounts credited

Bonneville

lease

Development

Corporation

agreements, to pay any reasonable

counsel
fees with

has
said

submitted
affidavit
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an

affidavit

incorporating

actual time and charges made in this matter.
22.

2
fact,

All

3

in

4

Commercial Code.

financing

From

5
6

of

the

agreements

the

agree

that

that were

foregoing

findings

the

subject

of

leases

to the

fact,

the

were,
Uniform

Court

now

enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

7
1.

8
9

parties

Rodney

F.

That

the

Gordon,

guaranties

Jim

Hansen,

of

the

and

individual

Frank

A.

defendants,

Nelson

(exhibits

10

2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee

x5
F x*

n

the leases entered into by Bonneville Corporation and are legally

»HO

12

3 °
o0 = T

>* " 13

binding contracts.
as

to

lease

Although these documents may have been blank

number,

date,

and

even the equipment

covered,

the

HO
ID

U

~

3(0 S g

5

CM h
-J

<

0)

2

defendants

H
15

knew

or

should

have

known

that

the

documents

intended for the five leases at issue.
2.

16

That

the

sale

17

reasonable

and

18

Commercial

Code.

19

was

to

20

was commercially reasonable.

given

3.

21
not

conformed

the

The

to

sale

individual

The Court

commercially

of

the

the
was

collateral

was

requirements

of

a

private

sale,

defendants, and

finds

that the

Uniform

after

the price

sale of the wood carving

Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the price of this carving.
Court

check

that

25

($6,000.00)

26

as an offset.

finds
was

not

that

notice

obtained

23

The

and

the

was

4.

reasonable

commercially

22

24

were

allows

the

cashed

an

Six

should
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offset

Thousand
also

be

of

Ten

Dollar
allowed

5.

1
2

The Court finds that the damages should be computed

as follows:

3

a.

principal

amounts

due

and

owing

4

the

5

at the the statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.

date

of

the

6

b.

7

value

of

8

Eight

Hundred

9

t;

All

the

filing

The

c.

the

plaintiff

equipment
Five

of

in

Dollars

complaint

should

earn

as

of

interest

should

be

awarded

the

residual

amount

of

Twenty-Three

Thousand

the
and

Sixty-Five

Cents

($23,805.65).

The amount of damages pursuant to lease

10

number 56809 is One Hundred Sixty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred

11

Ninety-Seven Thousand and Ninety-Seven Cents ($163,997.97).

JlO
0 < r- 1 «

»H^ 12

5g"» 13
<

U

d.

The amount of damages pursuant to lease

number 56810 is One Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred

«

u <2
^ ° 14

Seventy-Nine Dollars and Fourteen Cents ($174,879.14).

„ <
(0
W H
-I

8

15

e.

The amount of damages pursuant to lease

<

16

number 56811 is Three Hundred Five Thousand Eight Hundred

17

Forty-Five Dollars and Sixty-Three Cents ($305,845.63).

18

f.

The amount of damages pursuant to lease

19

number 56812 is One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred

20

Seventy-Seven Dollars and Ninety-Two Cents ($148,677.92).

21

g.

The amount of damages pursuant to lease

22

number 57938 is Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Sixteen Dollars

23

and Ninety-One Cents ($21,416.91).

24

The total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff

25

is Eight Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three

26

Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($838,623.22).
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99A

6.

Defendants

should

be awarded

an offset

these damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars

against

($10,000,00)

and Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the unpaid check.
7.

The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff

should be Eight

Hundred

Twenty-Two

Thousand

Six Hundred

Twenty-

Three Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22).
8.

In addition

to the foregoing,

plaintiff

should

t(u>iujv- Ttau^*<*

TAUAJ

be awarded i t s attorney's fees ,in the amount of fipypnteen Thou&af»d

/iui^c^txiU^
-Dollars

C ^

J
(?r7, 000.00) .'
£/-J^
9. Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred

herein in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302.00).
DATED this

l9

day of March, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HJNDLEY

ML /?)•

Citrfc

0«*>uty Oimrk

£J/M 2

Judith M. Billings
District Court Judge

Y-

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on the

,%£• day of March, 1985,

I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to the following:
John G. Marshall
Attorney for defendant Nelson
525 East 300 South, No. 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
James N. Barger
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon
255 East 400 South, No. 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ATTACHMENT A to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
_
IFG Leasing Company v. Bonneville Development Corporation, Civil ho. C-83-8536
Amount
Interest
Lease
(Remaining lease
Amounts Received
10% from 12/12/83
Number Date
payments)
Accounts Receivable Sales Taxes
(Date complaint filed)
56809

56810

56811

56812

57938

5/13/82
9/28/84
2/21/85

$162,280.08

5/13/82
9/28/84
2/12/85

$172,385.24

5/13/82
9/28/84
2/21/85

$301,486.67

5/13/82
9/28/84
2/12/85

$146,558.34

5/13/82
9/28/84
2/21/85

$21,111.46

Ba^
I

$16,982.84

$679.31

**$12,849.03
$ 5,851.70

$162,
$158,
$163,

$17,397.21

$695.89

**$i3,649.13
$ 6,241.98

$172,
$168,
$174,

$30,428.76

$1,217.15

**$23,871.14
$10,916.58

$301,
$294,
$305.

$14,791.41

$591.65

**$11,604.21
$ 5,306.78

$146,
$143,
$148.

$85.23

$ 1,671.56
$764.44

$21,
$20,
$21.

$2,130.55

••Calculated from date of filing of complaint, December 12, 1983.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Total:

$838,

FILED iw uLe^K-hs OFFICE;

Salt Lsko Cc'ruy U^h"""
|Q

J. BRUCE READING, No. 2700
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-7870

193
OJ

^^.^SOS-S

Court

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IFG LEASING COMPANY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs

3t? $£T - Z'J

BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION d/b/a RAMADA INN,
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al. ,

Civil No. C-83-8536

Defendants.

^fjfy

Judge Judith M. Billings

The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court from
February 21, 1985 through February 25, 1985 with the plaintiff
appearing through

its authorized representatives and through

its counsel, J. Bruce Reading, the defendants Hansen and Gordon
being represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and the
defendant Nelson appearing in person and being represented by
Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law, and the Court having heretofore
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters
the following judgment.
1.

The guaranties of the individual defendants

Rodney F. Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. Nelson (exhibits
2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee
the lease agreements entered into by Bonneville Development
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

Corporation and are legally binding contracts.

2

2.

3

reasonable and conformed to the requirements of the Uniform

4

Commercial Code.

5

reasonable.

6
7

3.

9

4.

SB 12
v

a.

Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the wood

b.

Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the uncashed

check.

00
I O

-u »^ 13

It is ordered that the defendants be allowed the

carving; and

10
11

The sale of the wood carving was not commercially

following offsets:

8

i

The sale of the collateral was commercially

All principal amounts due and owing as of the date

of the filing of the complaint shall earn interest at the

O

<2 14

statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.

I-

i

15
16

5.

Damages shall be computed regarding the leases as

follows:

17

a.

Residual value in the equipment:

18

b.

Damages pursuant to
lease number 56809:

$163,997.97

Damages pursuant to
lease number 56810:

$174,879.14

Damages pursuant to
lease number 56811:

$305,845.63

Damages pursuant to
lease number 56812:

$148,677.92

Damages pursuant to
lease number 56938

$21,416.91

$23,805.65

19
c.
20
21

d.

22
e.
23
24

f.

25
26

Total amount of damages suffered
by plaintiff:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$838,623.22

6.

The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff

2

shall be Eight Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three

3

Dollars.and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22), and judgment is hereby

4

awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendants in said amount.

5

7.

In addition, plaintiff shall be^awarded its reasonable

[v n,j<6S\rD J

6
7
8
9
10
c5

n

- CD
3 I

t W
ll ^

5

0
M H

J

w

13

rt

2

attorney's fees in the sum of SuvcuLueii Tliuaaand Dollars
(•$•17! OOCUjH)) .
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred

in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302.00).
9.

The above amounts shall accrue interest at the rate

of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of judgment until

O

lt$ 12
-

QA .

paid in full.
DATED this

ffi

day of March, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

14

ATTEST

15

H. DIXON HiNDLEY

16

C^ni^C2).i\c\zf<r _

Cfctf*

<

Deputy Cfcwfc

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

ay, /?). /3J/M.X

J j ^ l t h M. B i l l i n g s
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on the

ffVr
day of March, 1985,
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Judgment to the following:
Mr. John G. Marshall
Attorney for defendant Nelson
525 East 300 South, No. 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. James N. Barber
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon
255 East 400 South, No. 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after
default — Effect of disposition.

*

(3)

*

*

*

*

Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which
. any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard
price quotations he may buy at private sale.
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WYOMING STATUTES 1977

§ 34-21-963, S e c u r e d party's right to d i s p o s e of collateral
after default; effect of disposition (9-504).

*

*

*

*

*

(c) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or privale proceedings and
may be made by way of one (1) or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to
decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notificalion of the lime and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the lime after which any private sale or other intended disposition
is lo be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in the
case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the
collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of
the debtor in this state or who is known by the secured party to have a security
interest in the collateral. The secured party may' buyat any public sale and'if
the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy
nl private sale.
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator
or intestate out of his own estate.
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78-25-17, "Writings bearing obvious alterations—Explanation required.
~The. party producing as genuine a writing which has been, altered, or
appears to have been altered after its execution in a part material to
the question in dispute , must account for the appearance of alteration.
He may show that the alteration was made by another without his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of" the parties affected by it,
or otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration does
not change .the meaning or language of the instrument.. If he .does this,
he. may give the writing in evidence, but not otherwise.
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